WHO IS PROMOTING INTOLERANCE?

OK, this is Stan's current take on an interview with PZ Myers, as reported at AID (Atheism is Dead).

Color me unimpressed. This is my reply to Stan:

Basically, I find this post to be so overblown that it would be laughable if it wasn't so obvious that you are deeply offended by the whole thing. I don't see that PZ is saying that parents don't have the right to instruct their kids. Let's look at the original question and note the qualifier in bold:

“But don’t parents have a right to teach their children what they believe to be true without a professor undermining certain deeply held beliefs?"

In other words, do parents have the right to not have their child-raising choices contradicted at a university (professors, after all, don't work in the public schools)?

Clearly, no, they don't have that right.

Further, is PZ trying to impose his will on these families, or simply expressing his disapproval? Again, let's go to the source:

".. we have an interest in saying, ‘No, you shouldn’t be doing that.’”

I'm baffled. Is Stan saying that PZ and like-minded folks don't have the right to object? Expressing disapproval does not constitute a fundamental limitation of anyone's civil liberties, but depriving atheists of free speech at a university setting certainly does. Surely someone was bright as Stan can see that his post could be interpreted as advocating the latter?

You also write:

So PZ and intolerance go hand in hand.

Strange. I post on PZ's blog and, for whatever it's worth, have been singled out as an outstanding poster. Does that sound like intolerance?

It's not like I'm a stealth theist. I make no bones about being a (decidedly-imperfect) Christian. I've met PZ personally. I've had lunch with him. We've had beers together. We don't agree on some topics, but we tolerate each other pretty well. How do you explain that? Can't you distinguish between your beliefs (of whose acceptance you are not entitled) and the civil liberty of religious conscience?

I can, and from where I sit, while PZ clearly rejects my beliefs in unflattering terms, I don't actually see him attempting to tell me what I must believe or in other ways taking liberties. What evidence can Stan produce to support the latter claim?

RAPPING EVOLUTION, WITH STAN

Stan sums up his feelings regarding the theory of evolution by natural selection (TENS, for short):

First, evolution resulting in speciation requires mutation; possibly introgression; and sexual selection. I am now able quote sources on this.

I'd like to see them. As far as I can see, there's absolutely no requirement for sexual selection. Asexual populations evolve as well. And, I think Stan's too hung up on mutations, especially in terms of their randomness. Mutations happen constantly, whether the populations in question speciate, or no. You might say it is a built-in feature of living things. One could just as well say that 'evolution resulting in speciation requires reproduction.'

Second, I am still unaware of real examples of true speciation, with the single possible exception of ring species, which I still have under study. I am not convinced that the species ever really were the same identical creature; that is not empirically provable. It appears to be another extrapolation of fortuitous circumstances, ie, circumstantial evidence.

The classic unlooked-for case of incipient speciation was stumbled upon, quite by accident, by Dobzhansky's group in the late 1950's and spawned a fascinating series of articles, many of which are available at the PNAS archives. The Drosophila literature is filled with this stuff, but what makes the Llanos B strain of D. paulistorium so intriguing is that it appears to be sympatric with other populations. It's been suggested that somewhere between the Orinoco basin and the lab that some of the flies got 'jet lag', and habitually bred later than other varieties whose internal clocks were less brittle. These flies were effectively separated from other flies with which they might have interbred in the wild.

Whether or not a mutation was instrumental was not actually determined in the initial research, though I should confess for Stan's benefit that I am certain that mutations occurred both before and after the speciation event. For me, bottom line, there are other mechanisms besides point mutations which, when coupled with some form of isolation, can lead to speciation. Stan, I would encourage you to go to the PNAS site and just search under 'Drosophila paulistorium' or 'Dobzhansky' and enjoy the reads. They are surprisingly accessible, tokens of an earlier time in biology before the molecular revolution had hit its stride.

And, for a very specific and recent instance of Drosophila sp. undergoing speciation in the wild, check out this article. It's part of a burgeoning literature on in situ evolution in various taxa from a model site in Israel that's been christened 'Evolution Canyon', whose usefulness can be seen in this graphic, from Johannes Sikorski's home page:



If the usefulness of this location doesn't immediately suggest itself, Sikorski has a very thorough explanation on his site which I commend to everyone.

YOUR HOST: Onward, With A Caveat

Stan, in a prior post, looks at the recursive nature of human thought ('we think about thinking about thinking,' ad infinitum...) as suggestive of the poverty of a strict materialism. Hey, I'll buy that, but I'm not sure it proves what he thinks it proves.

Before I go on, though, I should point out it's been nearly two weeks since this last post and I have to apologize for my silence. In my defense, I preached at my church the previous weekend and had a test in my Wednesday night class this week, so this has been an exceptionally busy last week. Going on....

Anyway, Stan writes:

Since thoughts and speech are predetermined, they are not reflective of any personal volition of the owner. As such, the events have no meaning, either to the owner or the listener, and the results of such thought and speech events should also have no meaning.

I'm just not sure that follows. One could reject a strict materialism (as most philosophers, even atheist ones, do) without necessarily concluding that naturalism was false. Many people recognize that there all sorts of emergent properties which do not lend themselves to a reductive explanation, since knowing what atoms are made of or how they tend to bond does not in itself predict anything about complex phenomena which are produced by an interaction between other complex objects. Living things exhibit apparent design, as in the neural networks that manifest recursive thought, but the engineering metaphor breaks down. A good source to read on this would be John Holland.

Anyway, for the sake of discussion, let's go forward from this point, Stan, as long as you understand that I don't think you've ruled out naturalism with this move.

STAN: Venturing Out Without A Net

Stan writes. I'll comment later! Take it away, Stan:

"Now that the conversation with Scott has ventured tentatively into the region of intangible entites, it seems necessary to think about what type of objects we might expect to come across in such a place of non-sensuality. When we shove off from the shores of Materialism, what is left to find?

So let's start with Materialism, and then, push off.

Materialism blockades the access to transcendentals, and requires, by definition, that all mental objects actually be physically manifested in the meat of the brain. So the mind is by Materialist definition deterministic, or at least partially deterministic, which amounts to the same thing.

Materialism depends upon a blind, predetermined succession of physical brain events occurring, which result in the mind, the will, and language, all of which are physical and predetermined.

"The brain is a meat machine";

Marvin Minsky


“We and all other animals are machines created by our genes. A monkey is a machine that preserves genes up trees"

Richard Dawkins

Since thoughts and speech are predetermined, they are not reflective of any personal volition of the owner. As such, the events have no meaning, either to the owner or the listener, and the results of such thought and speech events should also have no meaning.

If these entities are without meaning, can they produce meaning, or project meaning? How could this be decided?

If the mind has no meaning and projects no meaning, then language has no meaning, and these very words have no meaning. Therefore it is left up to our intuition to determine whether or not meaning could exist, either here or elsewhere.

In fact, we might ask ourselves if the word “meaning” itself has a meaning. If we did, we would be using language. So we must have intuited (and believe) that language has meaning, or the exercise would be futile and a waste of time. And we also must have believed that meaning exists, because we asked if that word had any.

So, since we do believe in meaning, we have, then, intuited that meaning exists and that the word "meaning" has meaning. So meaning, and the "meaning of meaning" are now seen to be valid mental objects, and objects which are not physical in any manner.

The same goes for ideas: we all develop the idea of an idea. It is necessary for invention:

"What is required for all other human inventions is the notion that one can actively, consciously construct new ideas. We take this for granted, but it is not a "natural" development. Three-year-old children have lots of ideas and even make up new ideas. But they do not have the Idea of an Idea that they can construct anew; they do not naturally arrive at the idea that making up new ideas is something people do. The Idea of an Idea is a cultural creation that children have to learn."

"It is only with the Idea of an Idea that we get conscious specific intellectual constructions like democracy, science, the number system, the computer, the birth control pill, and so on. The Idea of an Idea is the generative notion behind the very notion of an invention and is causally necessary for all specific inventions."

George Lakoff is Professor of Linguistics at the University of California at Berkeley, where he is on the faculty of the Institute of Cognitive Studies.


Of course, an idea is a transcendent mental entity; it is not measurable by any material, natural, empirical method. It is known to exist in ourselves only by introspection; in others only through either communication (a transcendental), or by inference (also a transcendental). The mind states, or brain states, or electrical activity of the brain will never serve to reveal an “idea of an idea”.

These are just starting points for launching into the portion of reality that is accessible only through intuition.

Are these points acceptable? Can we move forward from here?"

YOUR HOST: Towards Intuition, With Misgivings

Stan wrote a lot of interesting things in the last post in an attempt to make sure that he is not misunderstood. I apologize for taking so long to reply, but it was challenging for me to read. I'll try to make my observations brief, because he clearly wants to get on with a project in reasoning that takes the validity of intuition as a means of probing the 'non-physical' as given (more on that later!)...

Stan does not deny the effectiveness of science as practiced in its domain, which he covers with the gloss 'empiricism.' In fact, he is at pains to make sure that he is not painted as 'anti-science.'

I agree. Science does seem to be the best means of investigating the natural world.

Stan invokes both Popper and Einstein in defense of the use of intuition in science.

I agree that scientists use intuitions to guide their investigations and reasoning process all the time, and that it is not necessary to shoehorn investigation of intuitions into the research program in order to call it scientific. The problem of where the hypothesis comes from (abduction) is interesting, but not critical to science as generally practiced. I don't care if a hypothesis comes from an astrology column! All I care about is whether it makes a claim that can be tested, and thus in principle falsified. For this reason, however, I do deny that intuitions can be formally invoked as part of the hypothesis/theory/model etc. under consideration.

Stan then goes on:

"Maybe more pointedly, “can evidence via intuition ever point to the validity of an intangible existence?” Or maybe, “can evidence via intuition provide enough certainty to support belief in an intangible existence?”

You see, I believe that it can, and I believe that, in spite of having no tangible empirical data to back me up."

OK, well, I believe that, too. I do think that what Stan defines as 'internal experiential evidence' exists, and that it might be valid for the system that it describes: that is, it might correspond with truth at least as well as any type of evidence. However, I also believe that the potential validity of that description is confined to the system in which the experience takes place, and that could present a severe limitation.

Stan concludes:

"This path, then, is non-empirical; I wonder if you wish to take off and leave the land of the tangible, for the possible existence beyond tangible? Can we accept the existence of intuition as a tool for acquiring evidence? Can we see that there are things that can be accepted as true or valid, without tangible physical evidence? If not, then I suggest that the philosophy being held to is metaphysical naturalism, which is a lock-down situation. I know that you denied that, but then you also seem to absolutely require physical test results for non-physical entities; so one of those must be an error, possibly my error of interpretation.

Can we move on into the arena of intuition?"

Obviously, if we don't accept this as a condition for further investigation, Stan feels the discussion grinds to a halt. It's been too good a discussion, too thoughtful, for me not to want to see where Stan's line of reasoning ends. So, by all means, Stan, continue. All I ask is that you keep in mind that neither of us has presented any justification for widening the sphere in which our private intuitions could be said to be generally valid. I expect that in order to do that, you will have to appeal to what you call 'intuitive evidence' based upon the First Principles. I look forward to your next post.

STAN to Scott: Climbing high? or Climbing out?

Stan replies to my previous post. As always, I've taken the liberty of slightly reformatting it for readability on my blog. I encourage comments from interested readers either to Stan or myself. I will reply as time permits. Stan writes:

Popper wrote that falsification is his method to eliminate the “demarcation” problem, which is the problem of separating the physical issues from the metaphysical issues. Metaphysical issues cannot be falsified for the same reason that they cannot be proven: they are not physical. At one point Popper writes that it doesn’t matter if the falsification testing is done, what matters is that it could be done. The capability of testing for falseness proves the material nature of the issue, and eliminates any metaphysical contenders, thereby showing the suitability of the issue for empirical pursuit.

As I tried to emphasize before, the purely non-physical cannot be found in the purely physical realm. Period. I do not dispute this, I agree 100%, because it is true by definition. It is a tautology; or as Popper calls it, a universal. And for that reason, physical testing of non-physical issues can not be expected to produce physical test results, ever. For one thing, how would one test a non-physical thing, physically? It is contradictory, paradoxical, and in Popper’s words, non-sensical (sort of a play on words there).

Are we able to agree that there is not now and never can be physical proof of the non-physical? For example, all ID references are actually inferences drawn from certain characteristics of certain phenomena. There is not, and cannot be, the certainty of tangible proof of intelligence which might have been involved in our history. While inferences are widely used in historical biology, that is not the issue here. Inferences do not lead to certainty, and metaphysical inferences are not empirically useful. I think we agree to this?

Scott said,

“To me, the question is whether or not you can reason your way to such a position [a realm outside naturalism] on the basis of evidence.”

“But here’s the thing: if I can’t also connect the dots between those claims and purely natural causes, then practically speaking, I’m not making much headway. It remains but a metaphysical stance only. So we can have that conversation, if you like, but I hope you understand the burden lies with you.”

“Remember, the question for me is not whether or not I assent to the existence of a realm outside naturalism, because (after all) I hold pretty conventional Christian beliefs. To me, the question is whether or not you can reason your way to such a position on the basis of evidence. For now, I’ll forego the question of whether or not either of us possess an ‘internal faculty of discrimination’ that's valid, etc.....if only to give you a fighting chance, Because, Stan, that hill you want to climb ?....it’s steep, brother.”

Assuming that this is a discussion and not a debate, the question of burden seems odd; however, I accept the burden for the purpose of this conversation, and now I request a serious look into the nature of “evidence” as I have highlighted in your comments, above. Can we find any type of credible evidence that speaks for a non-physical reality? Even given the understanding that the evidence we seek is not for an empirical entity? If we demand empirical, “purely natural” causes, then we have regressed to metaphysical naturalism, haven’t we? So we do need to investigate the nature of evidence and the limits or expansiveness of its capabilities.

There are several categories of evidence, generally including sensory (tangible), internal experiential, and intuited. We can ignore the “revealed” and “eyewitness” categories for now. I suggest the following for discussion:

Sensory evidence is derived from our apprehension of external sources and is useful to empiricism, because external sources are accessible to other’s sensory inputs also, and can be verified independently.

Internal experiential evidence is independent of external sources, and is useful in defining the being that is one’s self. This is the evidence invoked by Descartes, who rejected all sensory evidence in order to discover what sort of a “being” he was, based on his unique internal composition. Because this sort of evidence is outside the auspices of empiricism, Materialists deny its existence, insisting that internal experiences are deceptions visited upon us by our own nervous system. Where is the evidence of deception? Why should a deceived Materialist be thought credible anyway?

Intuitive evidence is the knowledge of valid concepts which exist both outside of empiricism, and outside one’s self. Logic, mathematics, universals are some of the issues determined to be valid intuitively. Some Atheists, notably Nietzsche, and followers denied that any of these First Principles or universals could be proved and therefore they were not valid and could not be accepted. (“Beyond Good and Evil”, Friedrich Nietzsche; translated, Walter Kaufmann, Vintage 1989, p22-24.) The deception lies here, in conflating the need for testing with non-physical, intuited true essences.

As long as we have Popper up to bat, here are some related excerpts from his book, “The Logic of Scientific Discovery”:

Popper on Metaphysics:

“The fact that value judgments influence my proposals does not mean that I am making the mistake of which I have accused the positivists – that of trying to kill metaphysics by calling it names. I do not even go so far as to assert that metaphysics has no value for empirical science. For it cannot be denied that along with metaphysical ideas which have obstructed the advance of science there have been others – such as speculative atomism – which have aided it. And looking at the matter from the psychological angle, I an inclined to think that scientific discovery is impossible without faith in ideas which are of a purely speculative kind, and sometimes even quite hazy; a faith that is completely unwarranted from the point of view of science, and which, to that extent, is ‘metaphysical’.."

“Logic of Scientific Discovery”, Popper, 1935 /2006 Routledge; p16, 17. (Emph added)


On intuition, Popper opines, then quotes Einstein:

“My view may be expressed by saying that every discovery contains ‘an irrational element’, or ‘a creative intuition’, in Bergson’s sense. In a similar way Einstein speaks of the ‘search for those highly universal laws … from which a picture of the world can be obtained be pure deduction. There is no logical path’, he says, ‘leading to these … laws. They can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like an intellectual love (Einfuhlung) of the objects of experience.”

Popper, LSD, p 8,9; Einstein, Address on Max Planck’s 60th birthday, 1918. (emph added)

So, Scott, it is not necessary for me to climb the hill you have prescribed, because that hill is a paradox with no summit. (There can be no physical proof for non-physical existences; these are mutually exclusive, and their conjunction is contradictory and paradoxical). My approach is and has been to look for, oh say, something that we believe, with no tangible evidence possible for its existence.

I think that Materialism is rather more of a hole of its own construction, which it may not - by dogmatic principle - leave, and then condemns others for leaving or not entering. And again, methodological naturalist empiricism, down in that materialist hole, belongs there, sifting through the natural dirt. But that dirt is not all there is to reality, unless the other avenues of evidence are convincingly denied. They cannot be successfully empirically denied due to the paradox of their conjunction.

Here’s an example of a belief I came by recently, with no proof. After a recent medical escapade, I came to realize that I still exist as more than meat, even though being totally unconscious in the sense of being anesthetized (no dreams). When I recovered consciousness, I regained the same characteristics as before I was anesthetized. So my existence during that time, if one requires thought to be the basic prerequisite for existence, appeared to have disappeared, yet it subsequently returned completely. I have no knowledge of my mind’s existence during that time, but I infer from subsequent experience that it did not cease to exist. Can I presume to “know”, intuitively, the truth of this, that I did not cease to exist during anesthesia? The answer appears obvious, but the evidence is intuitive, not empirical; inferred, not experimental.

Maybe more pointedly, “can evidence via intuition ever point to the validity of an intangible existence?” Or maybe, “can evidence via intuition provide enough certainty to support belief in an intangible existence?”

You see, I believe that it can, and I believe that, in spite of having no tangible empirical data to back me up.

This path, then, is non-empirical; I wonder if you wish to take off and leave the land of the tangible, for the possible existence beyond tangible? Can we accept the existence of intuition as a tool for acquiring evidence? Can we see that there are things that can be accepted as true or valid, without tangible physical evidence? If not, then I suggest that the philosophy being held to is metaphysical naturalism, which is a lock-down situation. I know that you denied that, but then you also seem to absolutely require physical test results for non-physical entities; so one of those must be an error, possibly my error of interpretation.

Can we move on into the arena of intuition?

Your Host: ON TO METAPHYSICS?

Stan writes:

Popper's contribution of falsification is only valid to point, that point being, "which of the premises for falsifying are valid?" As Stove has shown this produces a similar infinite regression to that of the original proposition / syllogism. However, it can be practical as in the simple case of the black swans falsifying the statement "All swans I have seen are white, therefore all swans are white" (induction). However, falsification is far from a sure thing in complex cases.

I’m puzzled by this objection, because we should all know that a logically sound argument may still be rejected if we conclude there is good reason to doubt the truth of one its premises. Correct me if I’m wrong, Stan, but I don’t think Popper proposed falsifiability as a truth criterion, but rather as a criteria for whether or not a claim could be investigated scientifically. I want to make it clear that, for me, I’m not in the ‘Truth Business’ when I’m practicing science. I think of myself as being in the ‘Model-Building and Testing Business’, and have a modest confidence in science as compared with other methods in most circumstances.

Stan then writes:

The intent here is to try to move OUTSIDE science. The question is whether there is any evidence that might not be meaningful to tactile science, yet might be considered valid in the pursuit of reality outside the clutches of functional naturalism?

OK, Stan, I get that, but it seems to me you’ve really stepped in it now. Believe me, I would like nothing more than to be convinced that there’s a way to connect the dots between ‘evidence’ and ‘belief.’ I would love to be able to reason my way to faith, or at least intellectual assent to the reality of the supernatural. But here’s the thing: if I can’t also connect the dots between those claims and purely natural causes, then practically speaking, I’m not making much headway. It remains but a metaphysical stance only. So we can have that conversation, if you like, but I hope you understand the burden lies with you.

Remember, the question for me is not whether or not I assent to the existence of a realm outside naturalism, because (after all) I hold pretty conventional Christian beliefs. To me, the question is whether or not you can reason your way to such a position on the basis of evidence. For now, I’ll forego the question of whether or not either of us possess an ‘internal faculty of discrimination’ that's valid, etc.....if only to give you a fighting chance, Because, Stan, that hill you want to climb ?....it’s steep, brother.

STAN: A Step Forward, A Step Back

Stan responds to my previous post, as follows:

In terms of the mind-brain problem, much of the opposition to dualism is couched in terms of reductivism and / or sheer denial. Even Dennett refutes the eliminative materialism concept. Others have shown it to be self-refuting. In order to refute the dualist idea these days, it is now necessary to refute some actual science. The “elasticity” of both brain and neuron is shown, starting with studies in OCD, and studies in brain mapping of monkeys and then humans. In OCD it has been shown that the mind can force a change in the mapping of brain. Brain mapping of monkeys has shown a number of things, one of which is that the map is never the same when it is remapped. Plasticity is no longer in question. (Ref. “The Mind and the Brain”, Schwartz, Begley, Harper-Collins, 2002; “The Brain That Changes Itself”, Doidge, Viking, 2007).

In neural configurations, it has been shown that an individual neuron, far from being a “digit pipe”, can have many inputs, contains many logic “microcircuits” of complexity including flip-flops, and can reorganize itself (has plasticity). Neurons taken in this complexity have the ability to perform complex parallel computations. Moreover they can be focused and refocused, depending on the usage requirements. (Ref. “Biophysics of Computation”, Christof Koch, Oxford University Press, 1999). The parallel nature of the neuron / brain structure does not refute the supposed serial nature of the mind; with synchronicity and managed propagation delays parallel operations can perform serially; The complexity of this seems to refute the supposed accidental nature of the neural brain.

These developments do not help the case for the mind and brain being identical (monist).

Antonio Demasio, in “Descartes Error”, bases his conclusions solidly on metaphysical naturalism. The premise that Descartes was wrong is based on the presupposition that there is no “spirit” and no separation of the mind from the brain. Classical circularity in thinking, it proposes that, because there is no separation of the mind and brain, therefore: monism. The most generous interpretation would be that Demasio has created a tautology, defining monism based on an unproven axiom, assumed to be true.

Now as for Peirce (‘e’ before ‘i’, in his case), his lifelong pursuit of rationalism did include his invention (discovery?) of abduction. However, in the end he relegated it to the formations of hypotheses, and confined it to the first of three steps of inquiry. This is in line with with the process of empiricism, and not with historical science, which should be forensic and not abductively speculative.

Popper's contribution of falsification is only valid to point, that point being, "which of the premises for falsifying are valid?" As Stove has shown this produces a similar infinite regression to that of the original proposition / syllogism. However, it can be practical as in the simple case of the black swans falsifying the statement "All swans I have seen are white, therefore all swans are white" (induction). However, falsification is far from a sure thing in complex cases.

Finally Scott says,

“Bottom line: if you want to use intuitions as part of argument in science, you will need to justify their usage at every step. Justification will essentially boil down to this: in asserting that this or that item is axiomatic, do we gain testable claims, or not?”

It is not my intention to suggest that intuitions should be used in science. The intent here is to try to move OUTSIDE science. The question is whether there is any evidence that might not be meaningful to tactile science, yet might be considered valid in the pursuit of reality outside the clutches of functional naturalism? Scott seems to wish to dwell firmly in the realm of the tactile, and that’s OK, but it’s not my purpose to prove empiricism as a valid pursuit yet again. (Of course intuition is valid, but only in the proposal phase, not in the proof phase). As I have said before, I agree totally with the use of functional naturalism as a voluntary limit to the process of empiricism. Totally agree. But I also feel that there is reality which cannot be touched by tactile inputs. Maybe Scott disagrees, and if so, this conversation would be fruitless, since proving or disproving such a metaphysical reality using tactile inputs is not possible.

I recently came across an Atheist website which fairly tersely summed up the metaphysical naturalist position. He said (I’ll try to quote as nearly as I can remember it): “I have searched the natural universe and there is no evidence of supernatural phenomena”.

This is like saying, “I have searched all the brothels in the world, and there are no nuns to be found”. If one insists on an empirical proof, then the naturalist limitation to tangible phenomena locks out all other possible evidence. Yes, evidence.

Is there any evidence of any entity beyond the external physical entities that tickle our sensory inputs? If, like Descartes, we deny all sensory inputs as possible delusions, do we have our “selves” left? (BTW, the Cogito is indeed a tautology; tautologies are not fallacies, they are definitions in the sense that they express a bottom principle of truth or existence concerning a specific entity; ie, they form an absolute).

Is there no possibility of introspection, of creative abstraction, of internal experience that is non-physical? It is possible to deny these things, but the denial is hollow because we all experience them, and we know, intuitively, that they exist. It is possible to reduce them in theory to hardwiring; this is refutable. It does not seem possible to refute them, empirically.

It is this intuitive knowledge that I wish to discuss, not the impossibility of empirical justification for the metaphysical, which is granted. So put in Scott's terms, no, intuitive claims are not empirically testable; they are in fact internally testable using our innate faculty of discrimination (per John Locke). Ultimately it is our internal faculty of discrimination that provides a rational basis for thinking about things both physical and introspective, as well as internally experiential. It is an innate analytical tool for tactile inputs and internal experiences that are not tactile.

YOUR HOST: Axioms and Principles

On a previous post, Stan lays the groundwork for including 'intuition' as part of a philosophical toolkit to evaluate atheism and related issues in the philosophy of science. He rather helpfully makes a distinction between axioms and principles, as follows:

(a) A precept that is used to support a different claim, but which is itself unprovable, therefore it is assumed valid for the sake of argument. Structure: “Given N, and assuming A, then P”, where A is the axiom, unprovable but assumed valid for this instance.

(b) A precept that is self-evident, unprovable, whose negation is self-contradictory.

I would argue that usage (a) is consonant with science as practiced and is hardly unexamined, whereas usage (b) is likely to be avoided. For example, it is far from 'self-evident' that the Universe is lawful, else it wouldn't have taken millennia for human civilizations to depress magical thinking to the point where science was possible. The absolute lawfulness of the Universe as a whole (or its negation, non-lawfulness) is not, properly speaking, falsifiable. So this usage would be out of sync with the way scientists think. On the other hand, the assumption that the Universe is lawful is sufficient to justify the scientist's search for 'Laws'.

Unfortunately for Stan, he seems to want usage (b) to justify the inclusion of 'intuition' in the philosophical toolkit. Now, speaking as a science teacher, I've got no ax to grind against intuition per se, or (as Pierce framed it) abduction. It's the old question of 'where does the hypothesis come from?' I'm perfectly happy to employ abduction as source material for scientific investigation.

Practically speaking, I don't care where the hypothesis comes from: Kekule found benzene's structure in a dream, after all. What I want to know is this: after Popper, given an intuition exists, can this form the basis of scientific inquiry? That is, is there a way I can test (in Popper's idiom, falsify) the intuition, either directly or as a consequence of a claim uniquely tied to the intuition? If so, then I am satisfied.

But what if the intuition isn't source material? What if it's claimed to be foundational for inquiry? Here I am much more cautious, because I am not sure that every Principle urged by Stan is even true, much less foundational. Consider, for example:

Descartes
“Cogito ergo sum” (I think therefore I am) (also, “I doubt everything, but I think about doubting, therefore I am a thinking being, therefore I am)

Foundational? There is a rich philosophical tradition associated with the Cogito, but in general contemporary neuroscientists and philosphers are skeptical that Cartesian dualism actually resolves the 'mind-body problem'. Antonio Demasio, for example, has claimed that the Cogito reduces to a tautological claim of identity. Daniel Dennett has spoken rather witheringly about the non-existence of the 'Cartesian Theatre'. The eliminative materialism of the Churchlands comes to a similar conclusion. As another has urged, the mind seems to behave like a serial computer, while the brain is manifestly a case of massive parallel processing. The unitary self that each of us typically experiences as dividing reality into 'me' and 'not-me' may be an illusion foisted upon us by the brain's organization, and what we call an 'intuition' may be the sum of all manner of inputs, and so unlikely to be foundational.

Now, I suppose one could argue that this posits a core of 'irrationalism' in the way many scientists behave: if we can not be entirely confident of the natural foundations of rationality, how can we confidently proceed in employing rational thought to investigate nature itself? I don't think this argument has any force for me, because I don't personally subscribe to metaphysical naturalism, but it may well prove to be a particularly good arrow in the quiver of the faithful. But, since I believe science proceeds provisionally in its attempt to expand the sphere of human understanding, I don't carry that baggage. Science has been spectacularly successful at answering certain kinds of questions because it constantly filters claims through rigorous sieves of doubt, and it has a long history of being able to accept levels of uncertainty even at the most fundamental level. A bad joke: you don't see physicists wishing Heisenberg had never been Born, after all.

Bottom line: if you want to use intuitions as part of argument in science, you will need to justify their usage at every step. Justification will essentially boil down to this: in asserting that this or that item is axiomatic, do we gain testable claims, or not?

STAN: On Axioms and First Principles

My interlocutor Stan over at Atheism Analyzed is rather graciously attempting to reboot our convo, so for the benefit of those who might've had a hard time following the give-and-take, here's Stan (in deep violet) and yours truly (burnt orange)....

Axioms and First Principles

Scott, OK then, right to the point this time. The question at hand:

“Given that I need a foundation of some support, what principles would you commend, and for what reason? Am I compelled by logic to adopt any, some or all of these principles?”

There are several definitions of the concept, “axiom”. Two seem to fall out:

(a) A precept that is used to support a different claim, but which is itself unprovable, therefore it is assumed valid for the sake of argument. Structure:

“Given N, and assuming A, then P”,
where A is the axiom, unprovable but assumed valid for this instance.

(b) A precept that is self-evident, unprovable, whose negation is self-contradictory.

I think that (a) is the type of axiom to which you were referring. That type of axiom is not known absolutely, but could be considered statistically to be probable, as you said.

Type (b) is a sort of jump off point to the First Principles, which have the following characteristics (maybe more):

First Principles:

(1) Validity is self-evident, or it is “incorrigible” (not correctable).

(2) Unprovable.

(3) Negation is self-contradictory.

(4) Exist as a ‘bottom” element in a regressive analysis, without which an infinite regression would occur.

(5) Generally tautological (definitions).

(6) The circularity of tautology implies a priori comprehension.
For example, the dictionary uses words to define words (it is circular); one must understand some word at some point a priori in order to use the dictionary.


Examples of First Principles:

Euclid
“Things that are equal to the same thing are equal to each other”

Aristotle
"For the same (characteristic) simultaneously to belong and not belong to the same (object) in the same (way) is impossible."

Descartes
“Cogito ergo sum” (I think therefore I am) (also, “I doubt everything, but I think about doubting, therefore I am a thinking being, therefore I am)

The general list of First Principles is both epistemologically and ontologically applicable (i.e. both truth values and existence values).


These are intuitive and incorrigible:

a. Identity: if it is true it is true; if it exists it exists.

b. Non-contradiction: It cannot be both true and false simultaneously. It cannot both exist and not exist.

c. Excluded Middle: It cannot be partially true, partially false. It cannot partially exist.

e. Cause and Effect: For every effect there is a necessary and sufficient cause.


These are probabilistic:

a. The Immutability of math throughout the universe.

b. The Immutability of physical law throughout the universe.

c. The Immutability of physical law throughout time (past and future).

d. The mutability of all levels of verifiability (Gödel's theorems).


There is more detail here. (Note to the reader: The link goes to Stan's site, where you should search for First Principles)

Now to the point. If these things are wrong, then much of rational thought and it’s offspring, empiricism, cannot be thought to provide any valid concepts. So these things are thought to be true….without proof. More to the point they are understood as valid statements, intuitively.

If that last statement is true, then intuition is a valid tool for comprehension of concepts possessing those truth values which exist outside the range of empirical testing or proof.

I stop here, with the understanding that the discussion of erroneous intuition, imagination, self-delusion, and dreams might be next.

For now, is this path as stated so far, reasonable?

As for a box to contain my own philosophical position, radical idealism it is not. Perusing the box categories on Wiki, I suppose that Justificationism comes close. I accept and support the discipline of empirical science. I do not support Naturalism or Materialism which I consider to be false, agenda-burdened, and parasitic to empiricism. Abduction is difficult to support due to the use of wild extrapolations without checks and balances.

And I agree with Einstein’s rebuke to Hume concerning locking out meta-physics by definition:

“…those convictions which are necessary and determinant for our conduct and judgments cannot be found solely along this solid scientific way.For the scientific method can teach us nothing else beyond how facts are related to, and conditioned by, each other. The aspiration toward such objective knowledge belongs to the highest of which man is capable, and you will certainly not suspect me of wishing to belittle the achievements and the heroic efforts of man in this sphere. Yet it is equally clear that knowledge of what is does not open the door to directly to what should be .”

Albert Einstein, Science and Religion, Mein Weltbild, Amsterdam: Querido Verlag, 1934.

BARRIER TO UNDER-STAN-DING?

Stan and I have been bouncing back-and-forth, and I suppose a quick gloss of our perorations would be 'examining the philosophical basis of scientific practice.' It's that gray area, one supposes, between epistemology per se and the philosophy of science.

But Stan, we seem to have a problem as far as fostering a dialogue that's easy for others to follow, and that is that I can't seem to link to new specific posts on your blog. It seems as if any links I offer automatically take me to this site, which is Stan's web site, rather than to a specific blog post. What a hassle!

Now, Stan has obviously spent a lot of time organizing the above site to articulate his views, and it would be unreasonable to expect him to alter its entire structure simply to facilitate our discussion, so I am going to suggest that perhaps we should just do all the blogging here. With that in mind, I'm going to post a list of some (not all) of the things that Stan described as First Principles now, and respond (in part) in my next post

1. The Intuitive Principles

These principles, while not provable, are known to be valid intuitively

a. Identity. If it is true, then it is true; if it exists, then it exists.
b. Non-Contradiction. If it is true, then it cannot be false; if it exists, it cannot NOT exist.
c. Excluded Middle.A (singular, unity) concept cannot be somewhat true and somewhat false; a (singular, unity) thing cannot somewhat exist and somewhat not exist.
d. Cause and effect. Every effect has a cause that is both necessary and sufficient.
e. Cogito (Descartes). Because I doubt my own doubt, it is true that I think; because I think (truth), I must exist (fact).

2. The Probabilistic Principles.
These Principles seem to encompass both truth and existence

a. The Immutability of math throughout the universe.
b. The Immutability of physical law throughout the universe
c.The mutability of all levels of verifiability (Godel's laws).

3. The Presuppositional Principles
These principles are declared either as empirical constraints, or as part of a worldview.

a. No form of reality exists that cannot be either observed and measured directly or by the use of instrumentation.
b. No Singularities (temporary violations) exist in the physical laws of the universe.

STAN-DING DISCUSSION #2a

Stan, perhaps you haven't had time to respond to my last post, because your most recent post ("Seeking The Next Step") doesn't seem to address anything from my last. Basically, in Stan-Ding Discussion #2, I summarized my reasons why I didn't feel compelled as a science guy to delve into first principles, since they are effectively held provisionally, just like theories, and we justify them not because they've been proven true, but because they've proven useful and productive.

I might add, Stan, that the above distinction may well be pivotal to any argument that takes some version of logical empiricism as a starting point. There is, for example, a well-known (but also deeply-flawed) empiricist critique of scientific realism, which is probably the philosophical stance that most closely corresponds with my views as far as the meaning of scientific claims. You can read about that on the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) here.

Anyway, in the meantime I'll go ahead and repeat my earlier question:

Given that I need a foundation of some support, what principles would you commend, and for what reason? Am I compelled by logic to adopt any, some or all of these principles?

Again, if this is not where you want to go next, you can just tell me.

*

As a sidebar, I have a few comments about your last post. First, thanks for providing context but believe it or not, I kind of already had you pegged from leafing through your web site. You were obviously a non-believer with some scientific/technical training in your salad days, who later in life decided to reevaluate your personal atheism, and who now wants to make the claim that one can deduce the rejection of atheism on logical grounds. Gotcha.

Now, I'm definitely interested in that claim, but I will also be interested to see what would compel me to buy into a dichotomy between the 'historical sciences' and 'empirical science', especially since I'm pretty sure you're going to eventually confess that empiricism is not only not part of your belief system, but that you're going to offer some version of rationalism (which in its strong version is not compatible with empiricism) as part of your beliefs.

As far as my beliefs go, you ask: "I am curious how you segment your theism and your empiricism. Do you believe in separate non-overlapping magesteria?"

Well, again, I just take empiricism to be a flavor of thought within science. I don't identify the use of sense-datum with the be-all and end-all of scientific activity, and I think the attempt to cast a strict empiricism as a valid philosophy of science was a mistake. So I don't need to 'segment' theism and empiricism, because they don't occupy the same ontological status for me personally. This is not to say, however, that I endorse NOMA. While I don't feel constrained by empiricism per se, I do believe that there are areas where scientific claims overlap with, at the very least, the consequences of religious claims. That is why I wrote in my prior post about my interests in things like Pierce's concept of abduction and Popper's falsifiability criterion, because these actually do seem to have some bearing on the question of whether any kind of boundary condition between science and other (alleged) sources of knowledge actually exists.

I could write more, but I won't until I get some kind of reply to the question in blue above from my previous post. I look forward to it!

STAN-DING DISCUSSION #2

Stan, I’m worried that our exchange may get bogged down in terminology, and this may do you a disservice. You clearly have a predetermined target as grounds for discussion: namely, that you wish to move to some kind of ‘first principles’ as foundational for investigating nature, and (more specifically) to bring belief itself under scrutiny. Your ambition, as stated on your web site, seems to this observer to be nothing less than to use “the tools of logic and rational thought.... in a careful analysis of the Atheism itself.”

I’m not sure that I’m the best person for that conversation, either, because I am neither an atheist or an Atheist. The difference matters, I think, for atheist (lower-case) to me is simply descriptive of the absence of belief in gods, whereas Atheism (upper-case) implies that said absence is central and motivating to something like a belief system. As illustrative of the difference, as a science teacher who happens to be a theist, I really do think that science is an atheistic enterprise. But then, properly speaking, so is plumbing! Neither science nor plumbing, as a formal matter, involves the invocation of the supernatural. Yet there are plenty of scientists, and plumbers, and all manner of persons who privately harbor this or that belief, including the rather common one that conflates the methodological naturalism of science (which is merely scientific practice) with belief systems.

Anyway, I think your interest in this topic is clearly toward the latter, which is why this conversation has quickly turned on the nature of belief. Yes, it is certainly true that science has certain axiomatic foundations: that there is such a thing as causality, or that the Universe is lawful. And, to the extent that I incorporate such axioms as part of my private worldview, they become beliefs. So, in a sense science knowledge claims can often be represented as claims about what it is that should be believed, so the classic formulation is...

‘To know P is to believe that P is true.’

But, you know, scientific knowledge claims are held provisionally, rather than dogmatically, and on the basis of evidence. Knowledge may imply belief, but it does not imply a belief taken on faith, and that goes for the axioms of science. We accept causation and the lawfulness of the Universe not because they have been proved in any absolute sense, but because we have innumerable observations that support causation and lawfulness, and (this is a key point) many past observations that historically have been interpreted as random, acausal, unlawful etc. (such as supernatural claims) have, upon further investigation, been found to be better explained by scientific models that presume lawfulness. The sun, it seems, does not ride in a chariot.

I conclude, therefore, that I am not compelled to adopt any particular belief system as a personal matter either in doing science or contemplating the foundations of science. It is sufficient that such axioms exist as operational parameters for the conduct of science. These axioms, as with all generalizations in science, may not be true. They may be false. But I don’t need to care about that in order to do science. Based on experience, I and other scientists merely adopt the axioms provisionally as the best foundation for certain kinds of investigation. It is not so much that I intuit the Universe is lawful, now I look for its Laws; rather, I am interested in building models that describe and explain as many phenomena as possible, and the assumption of lawfulness not only greatly simplifies model-building, it seems increasingly difficult not to justify in light of the eminently-repeatable regularities that are apparently observed.

Now, the above attitude, I suppose, does count as something like a belief system in the sense that philosophers have given names to such attitudes. But it is a fluid thing that doesn’t lend itself to the neatest categories. In particular, I’m something of an instrumentalist as far as method is concerned, and a scientific realist in terms of building models to describe large sets of phenomena. The two philosophers whose views I find most compelling are Karl Popper and Charles Pierce, and the reason I feel that way is precisely because their views come closer (at least in my mind) to science as practiced. In fact, while I worry not a bit about the axioms of science, I worry quite a bit about concepts like abduction and falsification, because failure to attend to the niceties here seems to cripple or halt science.

Anyway, I think I’ve made my point. I don’t feel compelled as a scientist to delve into first principles. Perhaps, if I was a philosopher, I would feel more inclined, so for the purposes of our next post, let’s assume that I’m a philosopher. You seem to want to argue for foundational principles for the acquisition /evaluation of knowledge, and in particular for the claims of ‘big-A’ Atheism. Very well, then, assuming I’m a philosopher, my next question is this:

Given that I need a foundation of some support, what principles would you commend, and for what reason? Am I compelled by logic to adopt any, some or all of these principles?

Also, I urge you to stop me here if I am somehow missing the point, or if this is not where you want to go, and propose a different question for starting-over. I thank you in advance for any correction you might want to offer.

STAN-DING DISCUSSION #1a

OK, in response to the previous question Stan writes:

"...a working scientist has to believe that for each physical effect there exists a physical cause that is measurable and repeatable per the rules of empiricism, otherwise the efforts toward empirical resolution would be futile."

I hasten to say that the italics (and thus the emphasis) are mine, and that I've chosen to highlight this term to point out an area of doubt. I do not think that a 'working scientist' is obliged to 'believe' the above, for a number of reasons:

1) 'Belief' implies an act of faith; I do not think you have to take anything on faith to be a working scientist. Operationally, one can simply accept a certain claim is axiomatic or foundational for the purposes of doing work. Empiricism could be thought of as a belief system, but it could also be seen as an epistemological hypothesis, held provisionally like any other hypothesis within science....

2) Therefore, empiricism in the latter sense would not assert that for each physical effect there must be a physical cause that is measurable/repeatable, etc. This 'working scientist' would recognize that there are anomalous events detectable by the senses which do not seem to have a discernible physical cause, or which fall below the threshold of measurement, or which are unlikely to be repeatable on the basis of what is presently known. Note that none of these conditions necessarily implies an appeal to a non-physical cause, just a healthy skepticism about what can be known...

3) In any case, with or without the non-physical/immaterial/supernatural etc. there is nothing which obligates the working scientist to do anything other than work within the axioms of science, and empiricism as a belief system does not appear to be one of science's axioms, or else how could Newton cast horoscopes, or A.R. Wallace enthusiastically embrace spiritualism, etc.? As far as 'efforts toward empirical resolution' being futile, the question is not whether we have a complete or entirely accurate description, but whether a given model is the best at explaining the greatest number of observations. To the extent that this is true, the model is accepted provisionally as the best fit to its data. This is entirely sufficient to do science, and it no more or less futile an endeavor than painting a picture or writing a sonnet is futile.

STAN-DING DISCUSSION #1

I've been asked to enter into a sort of dialogue about the philosophy of science by Stan, who appears to be a regular commenter over at Vox's place and who has both a blog and a web site to promote his views. Stan identifies himself as a "A 40 year Atheist" who "analyzes Atheism, without resorting theism, deism, or fantasy."

My guess is that Stan would like to draw attention to what he feels is an original analysis of atheism, but one that would lead to some sort of modification/rejection of conventional non-belief. That's certainly what a cursory look at his stuff would suggest, but y'all check it out and make up your own minds. I want to say upfront that I don't know Stan, nor do I know exactly where he wants to go with this exchange, but I'm game, especially if I get some kind of new insight as to the limits of science, faith, etc.

So, after some discussion, we agree upon this starting question:

"Is there anything that compels a working scientist (who tends to function, albeit not exclusively, as an empiricist) into adopting either naturalism or materialism as a private matter?"

Stan's response can be found here. I will reply to him soon, hopefully tomorrow.