Stan replies to my previous post. As always, I've taken the liberty of slightly reformatting it for readability on my blog. I encourage comments from interested readers either to Stan or myself. I will reply as time permits. Stan writes:
Popper wrote that falsification is his method to eliminate the “demarcation” problem, which is the problem of separating the physical issues from the metaphysical issues. Metaphysical issues cannot be falsified for the same reason that they cannot be proven: they are not physical. At one point Popper writes that it doesn’t matter if the falsification testing is done, what matters is that it could be done. The capability of testing for falseness proves the material nature of the issue, and eliminates any metaphysical contenders, thereby showing the suitability of the issue for empirical pursuit.
As I tried to emphasize before, the purely non-physical cannot be found in the purely physical realm. Period. I do not dispute this, I agree 100%, because it is true by definition. It is a tautology; or as Popper calls it, a universal. And for that reason, physical testing of non-physical issues can not be expected to produce physical test results, ever. For one thing, how would one test a non-physical thing, physically? It is contradictory, paradoxical, and in Popper’s words, non-sensical (sort of a play on words there).
Are we able to agree that there is not now and never can be physical proof of the non-physical? For example, all ID references are actually inferences drawn from certain characteristics of certain phenomena. There is not, and cannot be, the certainty of tangible proof of intelligence which might have been involved in our history. While inferences are widely used in historical biology, that is not the issue here. Inferences do not lead to certainty, and metaphysical inferences are not empirically useful. I think we agree to this?
Scott said,
“To me, the question is whether or not you can reason your way to such a position [a realm outside naturalism] on the basis of evidence.”
“But here’s the thing: if I can’t also connect the dots between those claims and purely natural causes, then practically speaking, I’m not making much headway. It remains but a metaphysical stance only. So we can have that conversation, if you like, but I hope you understand the burden lies with you.”
“Remember, the question for me is not whether or not I assent to the existence of a realm outside naturalism, because (after all) I hold pretty conventional Christian beliefs. To me, the question is whether or not you can reason your way to such a position on the basis of evidence. For now, I’ll forego the question of whether or not either of us possess an ‘internal faculty of discrimination’ that's valid, etc.....if only to give you a fighting chance, Because, Stan, that hill you want to climb ?....it’s steep, brother.”
Assuming that this is a discussion and not a debate, the question of burden seems odd; however, I accept the burden for the purpose of this conversation, and now I request a serious look into the nature of “evidence” as I have highlighted in your comments, above. Can we find any type of credible evidence that speaks for a non-physical reality? Even given the understanding that the evidence we seek is not for an empirical entity? If we demand empirical, “purely natural” causes, then we have regressed to metaphysical naturalism, haven’t we? So we do need to investigate the nature of evidence and the limits or expansiveness of its capabilities.
There are several categories of evidence, generally including sensory (tangible), internal experiential, and intuited. We can ignore the “revealed” and “eyewitness” categories for now. I suggest the following for discussion:
Sensory evidence is derived from our apprehension of external sources and is useful to empiricism, because external sources are accessible to other’s sensory inputs also, and can be verified independently.
Internal experiential evidence is independent of external sources, and is useful in defining the being that is one’s self. This is the evidence invoked by Descartes, who rejected all sensory evidence in order to discover what sort of a “being” he was, based on his unique internal composition. Because this sort of evidence is outside the auspices of empiricism, Materialists deny its existence, insisting that internal experiences are deceptions visited upon us by our own nervous system. Where is the evidence of deception? Why should a deceived Materialist be thought credible anyway?
Intuitive evidence is the knowledge of valid concepts which exist both outside of empiricism, and outside one’s self. Logic, mathematics, universals are some of the issues determined to be valid intuitively. Some Atheists, notably Nietzsche, and followers denied that any of these First Principles or universals could be proved and therefore they were not valid and could not be accepted. (“Beyond Good and Evil”, Friedrich Nietzsche; translated, Walter Kaufmann, Vintage 1989, p22-24.) The deception lies here, in conflating the need for testing with non-physical, intuited true essences.
As long as we have Popper up to bat, here are some related excerpts from his book, “The Logic of Scientific Discovery”:
Popper on Metaphysics:
“The fact that value judgments influence my proposals does not mean that I am making the mistake of which I have accused the positivists – that of trying to kill metaphysics by calling it names. I do not even go so far as to assert that metaphysics has no value for empirical science. For it cannot be denied that along with metaphysical ideas which have obstructed the advance of science there have been others – such as speculative atomism – which have aided it. And looking at the matter from the psychological angle, I an inclined to think that scientific discovery is impossible without faith in ideas which are of a purely speculative kind, and sometimes even quite hazy; a faith that is completely unwarranted from the point of view of science, and which, to that extent, is ‘metaphysical’.."
“Logic of Scientific Discovery”, Popper, 1935 /2006 Routledge; p16, 17. (Emph added)
On intuition, Popper opines, then quotes Einstein:
“My view may be expressed by saying that every discovery contains ‘an irrational element’, or ‘a creative intuition’, in Bergson’s sense. In a similar way Einstein speaks of the ‘search for those highly universal laws … from which a picture of the world can be obtained be pure deduction. There is no logical path’, he says, ‘leading to these … laws. They can only be reached by intuition, based upon something like an intellectual love (Einfuhlung) of the objects of experience.”
Popper, LSD, p 8,9; Einstein, Address on Max Planck’s 60th birthday, 1918. (emph added)
So, Scott, it is not necessary for me to climb the hill you have prescribed, because that hill is a paradox with no summit. (There can be no physical proof for non-physical existences; these are mutually exclusive, and their conjunction is contradictory and paradoxical). My approach is and has been to look for, oh say, something that we believe, with no tangible evidence possible for its existence.
I think that Materialism is rather more of a hole of its own construction, which it may not - by dogmatic principle - leave, and then condemns others for leaving or not entering. And again, methodological naturalist empiricism, down in that materialist hole, belongs there, sifting through the natural dirt. But that dirt is not all there is to reality, unless the other avenues of evidence are convincingly denied. They cannot be successfully empirically denied due to the paradox of their conjunction.
Here’s an example of a belief I came by recently, with no proof. After a recent medical escapade, I came to realize that I still exist as more than meat, even though being totally unconscious in the sense of being anesthetized (no dreams). When I recovered consciousness, I regained the same characteristics as before I was anesthetized. So my existence during that time, if one requires thought to be the basic prerequisite for existence, appeared to have disappeared, yet it subsequently returned completely. I have no knowledge of my mind’s existence during that time, but I infer from subsequent experience that it did not cease to exist. Can I presume to “know”, intuitively, the truth of this, that I did not cease to exist during anesthesia? The answer appears obvious, but the evidence is intuitive, not empirical; inferred, not experimental.
Maybe more pointedly, “can evidence via intuition ever point to the validity of an intangible existence?” Or maybe, “can evidence via intuition provide enough certainty to support belief in an intangible existence?”
You see, I believe that it can, and I believe that, in spite of having no tangible empirical data to back me up.
This path, then, is non-empirical; I wonder if you wish to take off and leave the land of the tangible, for the possible existence beyond tangible? Can we accept the existence of intuition as a tool for acquiring evidence? Can we see that there are things that can be accepted as true or valid, without tangible physical evidence? If not, then I suggest that the philosophy being held to is metaphysical naturalism, which is a lock-down situation. I know that you denied that, but then you also seem to absolutely require physical test results for non-physical entities; so one of those must be an error, possibly my error of interpretation.
Can we move on into the arena of intuition?
2/01/2008
STAN to Scott: Climbing high? or Climbing out?
SEX, IN LUCY'S LAIR
OK, Fresno-area people. You don't want to miss this Valentine's Day-themed offering of Central Valley Cafe Scientifique. Not only will we be treated to Dr. Kaberi Kar Gupta's fascinating discussion of her own work with the endangered slender loris, but it will be nested in a larger discussion of primate mating strategies, and how this regulates social relationships.CHEMICALS, SCHMEMICALS
If you've been following my previous posts, you know that my district, in an administrative snafu, confiscated most of my school site's chemicals, severely impacting our ability to deliver college-prep laboratory experience. As you might imagine, we're unhappy. Here's the latest:
My colleague Mr. Fischer and several other teachers from other FUSD school sites met with district officials on Monday the 14th, 18 days ago. At that time, some of the brains behind the fiasco acknowledged 'mistakes had been made' and pledged that they would use their budget (not ours) to restore chemicals that shouldn't have been taken and which were needed for the curriculum as planned.
They asked all the schools to submit their list of what they needed, indicating they would not order until this was done so that they could bulk-order the lot and thus (presumably) save some money. Our school site already had its list in hand, with stock numbers and dollars ready to go, but those that weren't prepared were given until the end of that week to submit their list. Since it was a three-day weekend, the expectation is that said chemicals would be ordered on the following Tuesday (the 22nd).
Except that didn't happen. On the 22nd, my colleague Mr. Fischer contacted the district official responsible (let's call him JV), and was informed that no, the order hadn't been sent yet, probably not until (get this) NEXT Tuesday (the 28th). There is, as of now, still nothing to report and we took it upon ourselves to spend our own money to buy a few things, seeing as how it is now February and we're about to enter the fourth week of instruction sans chemicals.
Just how much more of this should any of us accept? Anyone who is a teacher will appreciate how this has completely hamstrung our instruction. It would be like an English teacher who returns to work finding that virtually all of their plays, poems, short stories and novels have been removed from the site. I suppose they could ask students to bring in newspapers and diagram sentences.
Speaking with two of my colleagues in Chemistry after school, I learned that in fact most of the chemicals have still not been ordered, and that the individual known as JV has been actively attempting to promote the use of another vendor for the high school people, over the objections of those who attended the Jan. 14th meeting. This raises the possibility that there is more afoot in this mess than an administrative misstep.
1/31/2008
SPEAKING OF METAPHYSICS...
Um, this is really cool but in a weird way. It's a virtual Neil Peart drum solo ("YYZ"), which means that it's virtual virtuosity. Me, I dabble with drumming as a means of realizing my studio recording projects, so my respect for those with serious chops is boundless. Peart is an amazing player, but I have to wonder what Ayn Rand would think of a virtual replication of a real creator's image and w
ork. I mean, did Peart get a cut? Did he have creative control of this simulation? Perhaps he should just destroy all of his recordings rather than be ripped off this way.
Then again, many Rush recordings are sort of virtual philosophy bull-sessions. Kinda deeply shallow, or as Apu might intone, full of shallow deepness.
What? This post is almost over? At last, I shrugged!
Your Host: ON TO METAPHYSICS?
Stan writes:
Popper's contribution of falsification is only valid to point, that point being, "which of the premises for falsifying are valid?" As Stove has shown this produces a similar infinite regression to that of the original proposition / syllogism. However, it can be practical as in the simple case of the black swans falsifying the statement "All swans I have seen are white, therefore all swans are white" (induction). However, falsification is far from a sure thing in complex cases.
I’m puzzled by this objection, because we should all know that a logically sound argument may still be rejected if we conclude there is good reason to doubt the truth of one its premises. Correct me if I’m wrong, Stan, but I don’t think Popper proposed falsifiability as a truth criterion, but rather as a criteria for whether or not a claim could be investigated scientifically. I want to make it clear that, for me, I’m not in the ‘Truth Business’ when I’m practicing science. I think of myself as being in the ‘Model-Building and Testing Business’, and have a modest confidence in science as compared with other methods in most circumstances.
Stan then writes:
The intent here is to try to move OUTSIDE science. The question is whether there is any evidence that might not be meaningful to tactile science, yet might be considered valid in the pursuit of reality outside the clutches of functional naturalism?
OK, Stan, I get that, but it seems to me you’ve really stepped in it now. Believe me, I would like nothing more than to be convinced that there’s a way to connect the dots between ‘evidence’ and ‘belief.’ I would love to be able to reason my way to faith, or at least intellectual assent to the reality of the supernatural. But here’s the thing: if I can’t also connect the dots between those claims and purely natural causes, then practically speaking, I’m not making much headway. It remains but a metaphysical stance only. So we can have that conversation, if you like, but I hope you understand the burden lies with you.
Remember, the question for me is not whether or not I assent to the existence of a realm outside naturalism, because (after all) I hold pretty conventional Christian beliefs. To me, the question is whether or not you can reason your way to such a position on the basis of evidence. For now, I’ll forego the question of whether or not either of us possess an ‘internal faculty of discrimination’ that's valid, etc.....if only to give you a fighting chance, Because, Stan, that hill you want to climb ?....it’s steep, brother.
1/30/2008
ANOTHER CLOUDED COUNTY
NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE
Now, not all of y'all may like this, but this web site from the United Church of Christ resonates with yours truly. I've never been a NOMA fan, because I recognize that the boundaries are messy. How can we claim that the magisteria of science and religion don't overlap, when the boundary of what science is capable of investigating is poorly-defined? No, real science is messy, and many of the consequences of religious claims are eminently testable, so there really are areas of potential overlap. The age of the Earth is an obvious example.
I think my skeptical friends might argue that while scientific explanations do not exclude the possibility of the supernatural (and thus, the free exercise of religion), that dogmatically-held supernatural claims can be 'science stoppers'. ID sympathizers would doubtless argue that a mirror dogma of naturalism holds true science hostage, but they simply won't hold their claims to the sort of evidentiary standard that will satisfy theists like myself, much less die-hard metaphysical naturalists. What I want is not negative arguments directed against the odd cases that evolutionary theory seems ill-equipped to address; I want positive arguments that admit no other possible explanation other than design.
Anyway, I hope you enjoy the web site.
1/29/2008
STAN: A Step Forward, A Step Back
Stan responds to my previous post, as follows:
In terms of the mind-brain problem, much of the opposition to dualism is couched in terms of reductivism and / or sheer denial. Even Dennett refutes the eliminative materialism concept. Others have shown it to be self-refuting. In order to refute the dualist idea these days, it is now necessary to refute some actual science. The “elasticity” of both brain and neuron is shown, starting with studies in OCD, and studies in brain mapping of monkeys and then humans. In OCD it has been shown that the mind can force a change in the mapping of brain. Brain mapping of monkeys has shown a number of things, one of which is that the map is never the same when it is remapped. Plasticity is no longer in question. (Ref. “The Mind and the Brain”, Schwartz, Begley, Harper-Collins, 2002; “The Brain That Changes Itself”, Doidge, Viking, 2007).
In neural configurations, it has been shown that an individual neuron, far from being a “digit pipe”, can have many inputs, contains many logic “microcircuits” of complexity including flip-flops, and can reorganize itself (has plasticity). Neurons taken in this complexity have the ability to perform complex parallel computations. Moreover they can be focused and refocused, depending on the usage requirements. (Ref. “Biophysics of Computation”, Christof Koch, Oxford University Press, 1999). The parallel nature of the neuron / brain structure does not refute the supposed serial nature of the mind; with synchronicity and managed propagation delays parallel operations can perform serially; The complexity of this seems to refute the supposed accidental nature of the neural brain.
These developments do not help the case for the mind and brain being identical (monist).
Antonio Demasio, in “Descartes Error”, bases his conclusions solidly on metaphysical naturalism. The premise that Descartes was wrong is based on the presupposition that there is no “spirit” and no separation of the mind from the brain. Classical circularity in thinking, it proposes that, because there is no separation of the mind and brain, therefore: monism. The most generous interpretation would be that Demasio has created a tautology, defining monism based on an unproven axiom, assumed to be true.
Now as for Peirce (‘e’ before ‘i’, in his case), his lifelong pursuit of rationalism did include his invention (discovery?) of abduction. However, in the end he relegated it to the formations of hypotheses, and confined it to the first of three steps of inquiry. This is in line with with the process of empiricism, and not with historical science, which should be forensic and not abductively speculative.
Popper's contribution of falsification is only valid to point, that point being, "which of the premises for falsifying are valid?" As Stove has shown this produces a similar infinite regression to that of the original proposition / syllogism. However, it can be practical as in the simple case of the black swans falsifying the statement "All swans I have seen are white, therefore all swans are white" (induction). However, falsification is far from a sure thing in complex cases.
Finally Scott says,
“Bottom line: if you want to use intuitions as part of argument in science, you will need to justify their usage at every step. Justification will essentially boil down to this: in asserting that this or that item is axiomatic, do we gain testable claims, or not?”
It is not my intention to suggest that intuitions should be used in science. The intent here is to try to move OUTSIDE science. The question is whether there is any evidence that might not be meaningful to tactile science, yet might be considered valid in the pursuit of reality outside the clutches of functional naturalism? Scott seems to wish to dwell firmly in the realm of the tactile, and that’s OK, but it’s not my purpose to prove empiricism as a valid pursuit yet again. (Of course intuition is valid, but only in the proposal phase, not in the proof phase). As I have said before, I agree totally with the use of functional naturalism as a voluntary limit to the process of empiricism. Totally agree. But I also feel that there is reality which cannot be touched by tactile inputs. Maybe Scott disagrees, and if so, this conversation would be fruitless, since proving or disproving such a metaphysical reality using tactile inputs is not possible.
I recently came across an Atheist website which fairly tersely summed up the metaphysical naturalist position. He said (I’ll try to quote as nearly as I can remember it): “I have searched the natural universe and there is no evidence of supernatural phenomena”.
This is like saying, “I have searched all the brothels in the world, and there are no nuns to be found”. If one insists on an empirical proof, then the naturalist limitation to tangible phenomena locks out all other possible evidence. Yes, evidence.
Is there any evidence of any entity beyond the external physical entities that tickle our sensory inputs? If, like Descartes, we deny all sensory inputs as possible delusions, do we have our “selves” left? (BTW, the Cogito is indeed a tautology; tautologies are not fallacies, they are definitions in the sense that they express a bottom principle of truth or existence concerning a specific entity; ie, they form an absolute).
Is there no possibility of introspection, of creative abstraction, of internal experience that is non-physical? It is possible to deny these things, but the denial is hollow because we all experience them, and we know, intuitively, that they exist. It is possible to reduce them in theory to hardwiring; this is refutable. It does not seem possible to refute them, empirically.
It is this intuitive knowledge that I wish to discuss, not the impossibility of empirical justification for the metaphysical, which is granted. So put in Scott's terms, no, intuitive claims are not empirically testable; they are in fact internally testable using our innate faculty of discrimination (per John Locke). Ultimately it is our internal faculty of discrimination that provides a rational basis for thinking about things both physical and introspective, as well as internally experiential. It is an innate analytical tool for tactile inputs and internal experiences that are not tactile.
1/28/2008
I TRIPLE-DOG DARE YA
Here we go again. At right you see budding barrister Casey Luskin, prize attack poodle of the Disingenuous Institute, who is now rattling his sabre, threatening Les Lane, a retired virology professor, because...oh my.....what can I say...for using the same photo I just posted on my blog.
Well, it's not an oopsie, Mr. Luskin. As Tim Sandefur (another attorney, mind), points out, you have no grounds for threatening Dr. Lane with legal action. Your threat here is as empty as the threats made by the DI regarding an informational packet accompanying the Nova documentary 'Judgement Day', as vacant as the notion that law professors can put 'Darwin On Trial' and pretty much the sort of vexatious litigation for which Larry Caldwell has become notorious.
In case you missed the point of this post, Mr. Luskin, let me make it clear for you. You and your fellow gang of DI lawyers are a bunch of empty suits. You have nothing that will stand up either in a court of law or in the scientific community, so you endlessly grandstand to the general public, counting on the fact that most laypeople don't know enough about the law or the practice of science to see through your smokescreens.
So, as with Dr. Lane, I'm using the photo above without your permission. And I'm going to continue to use it, unlike Dr. Lane, who graciously removed said photo at your request. I don't care if you don't like it, because, laughable as it seems to me, you're a public figure on this issue, and the public has a right to connect a face to a position that they may find odious. You are free to disagree, and threaten me with legal action, if you like. But you won't , because as Dover proved, you guys don't have the stomach for a real fight.
1/27/2008
BOHEMIAN LADY NAILS IT
Wendee Holtcamp is an award-winning nature writer, a doctoral candidate in biology at Rice University and a self-described 'evolutionist.' She is also a committed Christian, and that makes her thoughts on ID especially worth savoring, as when she remarks:
As a Christian myself, I always wonder why the IDers don't think for a moment that maybe God *isn't* on their side when he keeps giving victory after victory to the supposedly "other side"? Although God's ways are mysterious and no one can claim to fully know God's ways, God is certainly on the side of Truth (and I do believe that there is Truth), especially since in the Bible the devil is described as the "father of lies."
Well said, I say. You can check out the whole thing here, and I also heartily recommend this (soon-to-be-a-classic) essay which appears on the ASA (American Scientific Affiliation) web site.
WHERE'S CHUCKY?
This Congressional steroids stuff keeps getting interesting. First Clemens drags his feet, and now his former teammate, Chuck Knoblauch, seems to be in hiding. Knoblauch has yet to be served with a subpoena even though federal marshals have been looking for him for four days. For more info, read here. Curious, no?
